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In one of its most controversial decisions in years, the Supreme Court in May issued a 5-4 ruling in Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.1 that severely undercuts the ability of pay discrimination victims to enforce their 
rights under Title VII, the main federal anti-employment-discrimination statute.2  In its decision, the Court applied 
the statute of limitations in a way that ignored the realities of both pay discrimination claims, specifically, and 
workplace bias more generally. In so doing, it imposed an obstacle that will gravely inhibit the ability of bona fide 
discrimination victims to assert their rights.  This article will examine Ledbetter’s negative impact on rights-
claiming under Title VII and map out the legislative fix necessary to restore statutory protection against pay 
discrimination.  
 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
 
This case was brought by Lilly Ledbetter, the only female production supervisor at Goodyear Tire and Rubber’s 
plant in Gadsen, Alabama. An employee there for twenty years, she took early retirement in 1998, after being 
involuntarily transferred to a less-desirable job on the production floor. Six months prior to her retirement, 
Ledbetter filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
alleging various forms of sex discrimination. At trial, a jury concluded she had indeed suffered illegal pay 
discrimination on the basis of sex. (Her salary was as much as 40 percent lower than that of the lowest-paid 
male supervisor.) The jury awarded Ledbetter over $3.5 million, mostly in the form of punitive damages, which 
was reduced by the judge to $360,000 in accordance with Title VII’s cap on damages.3 
 
On appeal, Goodyear argued that Ledbetter’s claim had been time-barred with respect to all pay decisions made 
prior to September 26, 1997 -- 180 days prior to the date she filed her charge with the EEOC. The Supreme 
Court ultimately decided Goodyear was right. Thus, for Lilly Ledbetter, the Court’s adverse decision means that 
the entire $360,000 verdict in her favor must be vacated, even though she proved to a jury that multiple 
discriminatory decisions were made prior to September 26, 1997, that continued to affect her pay until the day 
she retired. Ledbetter, and most other victims of pay discrimination, will suffer for this narrow interpretation of 
Title VII.   
 
The issue presented by Ledbetter’s case is when pay discrimination claims must be brought in order to be 
timely. Title VII provides that an EEOC charge must be brought within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful 
employment practice occurred.”4  But when does the 180-day clock begin to run in the case of pay 
discrimination? That was the question presented to the Supreme Court in Ledbetter, to which there are three 
possible answers: (1) from the date of the pay decision that sets a discriminatory wage, (2) from the date an 
employee learns her pay is discriminatory (in the law, this is called a “discovery” rule), or (3) from the date any 
paycheck that pays an employee less because of her sex is issued (this is deemed a “paycheck accrual” rule).    
 
Briefly, the Supreme Court opted for the first approach: According to the majority opinion, the plaintiff has 180 
days after the pay decision that sets the discriminatory wage to file her charge with the EEOC in compliance 
with Title VII’s statute of limitations. The majority declined to consider whether a discovery rule might be used 
to extend the statute of limitations for discrimination that is unknown to the employee and flatly rejected the 
paycheck accrual rule.  
 
This ruling turned primarily on the Court’s interpretation of its own precedent, a 2002 ruling in National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) v. Morgan.5  There, it had held that “discrete” acts of discrimination 
must be challenged within 180 days of their occurrence. In so ruling, the Court rejected the so-called 
“continuing violations” doctrine, under which some lower federal courts had permitted plaintiffs to challenge a 
series of related acts of discrimination together, as long as at least one had occurred within the 180 days prior 
the filing of an EEOC charge.  
 
In Morgan, the Court carved out an exception for “hostile environment” harassment since, by its very nature, 
such a claim accrues over time and through the aggregation of multiple incidents of misconduct that together 
create the hostile environment. For such claims, a plaintiff can challenge harassment as long as at least one of 
the acts that together created the hostile environment occurred within the 180-day charge-filing period. 
 
Thus, the issue in Ledbetter was whether pay discrimination claims should be treated like a discriminatory 
firing, where the clock starts ticking immediately, or like hostile environment claims, where the clock starts 
ticking anew with each incident. In an opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito, the Ledbetter majority ruled that 
the “discrete” act rule applies to pay discrimination claims, departing from the longstanding position of the 
EEOC, the agency charged with enforcing Title VII.    
 
The Court’s rejection of Ledbetter’s claim turned on two basic conclusions: First, the Court ruled that under 
Morgan, a discriminatory pay decision is a discrete act that triggers the statute of limitations. Second, it ruled 
that a paycheck containing a discriminatory amount of money is not a present violation, but, instead, is merely 
the present effect of a prior act of discrimination. “[C]urrent effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, charged 
discrimination,” the Court wrote, “such effects have no present legal consequences.”6  
 
To reach the second conclusion, the Court relied on United Air Lines v. Evans, in which it had dismissed the 
discrimination claim of a flight attendant who had been wrongfully terminated and then rehired -- without 
seniority -- years later.7  The Court refused to permit her to challenge the loss of seniority, since it held that that 
was just an “effect” of the prior, uncharged wrongful termination.  The Court also relied on Delaware State 
College v. Ricks,8 in which a librarian who had been denied tenure, allegedly on the basis of race, was not 
permitted to sue within 180 days of his termination, since the notice of the tenure denial had been 
communicated to him a year earlier. Again, the Court held that the actual termination of his teaching contract 
was merely an effect of the allegedly illegal denial of tenure, rather than a present violation of Title VII.   
 
In relying on these precedents, the Court in Ledbetter effectively ignored another line of precedents in which it 
had applied a different rule to pay claims. For example, in Bazemore v. Friday, all members of the Court joined 
Justice Brennan’s separate opinion, in which he wrote: “[e]ach week’s paycheck that delivers less to a black 
than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII.”9  The Court in Ledbetter attempted to 
distinguish Bazemore on the theory that the employer had carried forward a discriminatory pay structure rather 
than a discriminatory pay decision. But a paycheck that is deflated because of a prior decision to pay an 
individual woman less because of her sex is no less a discrete instance of discrimination than one that is 
deflated because of a prior decision to pay all women less because of their sex. As Justice Ginsburg argued in 
dissent, the majority’s opinion in Ledbetter means that “[a]ny annual pay decision not contested immediately 
(within 180 days) . . . becomes grandfathered, a fait accompli beyond the province of Title VII ever to repair.”10  
An employer could pay a woman less than her male counterparts for her entire career, and admit that the reason 
for doing so is because she is female, as long as the decision to set the discriminatory wage happened at least six 
months earlier.   
 
Ledbetter’s Inhibition of Rights-Claiming for Pay Discrimination Victims 
 In order to prevail on a pay discrimination claim after Ledbetter, a victim must quickly perceive that she has 
suffered discrimination and promptly report it.  But that is a rare occurrence rather than the usual case.  
Ledbetter’s insistence that discriminatory pay decisions be challenged within 180 days is blind to the difficulties 
employees face in perceiving and challenging pay discrimination.   
 
Obstacles to Perceiving Discrimination 
 
There are many obstacles to victims’ perceiving discrimination in the workplace.11 For example, there is a well-
documented “minimization bias” that leads targets to resist perceiving and acknowledging discrimination even 
in the face of conduct that objectively qualifies as discrimination.12  Researchers have also shown that victims 
tend to downplay the likelihood of discrimination and attribute negative outcomes to other causes when 
discrimination is less obvious.13  In addition, social psychologists have shown that women, and members of 
other historically disadvantaged social groups, are reluctant to perceive themselves as victims of  discrimination 
because it conflicts with deeply-ingrained beliefs that the world is meritorious and individuals are responsible 
for their own fate.14 
   
Another factor that influences an individual’s perception of bias is her sense of entitlement.  An individual’s 
belief that she has experienced discrimination is contingent upon her belief in the illegitimacy of her current 
treatment.15 However, women’s sense of entitlement is skewed by the general tendency to perform intra-group 
comparisons.  Women tend to compare themselves to other women – not to similarly-qualified, similarly-skilled 
men -- in evaluating their treatment.  For example, working women tend to evaluate the fairness of their current 
pay by reference to what other women earn, and what they themselves have earned in the past.16  Such within-
gender comparisons by women lead to diminished salary expectations.  In studies where men and women are 
asked to set their own rates of pay for performing a specified task, men typically pay themselves one-third more 
than what women pay themselves for the same task.17  Recognizing that one’s wage is deflated, and the product 
of discrimination, is thus difficult. 
 
In addition, the limited availability of information, paired with limits upon the way people process the 
information that is available, further thwarts people’s ability to quickly perceive sex discrimination.  Studies 
have found that people resist perceiving individual instances of sex discrimination under normal conditions of 
information-gathering -- in which information trickles in piece-by-piece, showing individual instances of 
different treatment. People are much more likely to perceive discrimination when information regarding 
disparities is presented all at once -- showing across-the-board, organization-wide comparisons between men 
and women.18  Since employees almost never have access to that kind of global, synthesized information, 
individual instances of discrimination frequently go unnoticed. 
 
These problems make perceiving sex discrimination difficult in general, but they are greatly compounded for 
pay discrimination. While the results of hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, and transfer decisions are generally 
commonly known and discussed, employee compensation is typically hidden under a veil of secrecy.19  Victims 
of pay discrimination are hampered by the lack of transparency in employee compensation systems and a code 
of silence governing workplace salaries. Employers rarely disclose company-wide salary information, and 
workplace norms often discourage frank and open conversations among employees about salaries.  As a result, 
employees rarely know what their colleagues earn, much less what raises and adjustments are given out to 
others at each and every pay decision. This lack of transparency makes perceiving pay discrimination even 
more difficult than perceiving other types of discrimination. 
 
An employee who learns that she will receive a 5% raise, for example, will have little reason to suspect pay 
discrimination, without knowing, at the very least, what raises others have received. Indeed, the discriminatory 
pay gap may begin with no change at all in an employee’s pay, but rather with a decision to increase the pay of 
a male colleague, while leaving her pay unchanged for a discriminatory reason. And without access to full 
information about all of their colleagues’ salaries and the underlying reasons (whether legitimate or 
discriminatory) for the pay differences among them, it is next to impossible for an employee to accurately 
perceive individual instances of pay discrimination.21   
 
The burden that Ledbetter places on new employees to quickly perceive pay discrimination is particularly acute.  
The kind of informal connections through which employees learn the salaries of their peers do not exist for new 
employees. New employees are not likely to learn about pay discrimination until much later, after the offending 
pay decisions have long been in place. 
 
Obstacles to Challenging Discrimination 
  
Perceiving bias in pay before the limitations period expires is only half the problem. Even if an employee 
fortuitously learns that a recent pay decision was tainted before the 180 days elapse, there are significant 
obstacles to challenging discrimination that is accurately perceived. Research shows that employees rarely 
challenge discrimination, even when it is obvious.22 Even in the harassment context, for example, where the 
discrimination tends to be relatively blatant, filing a complaint is a last resort, after other strategies have failed.23  
 
The high risk of retaliation and the social costs imposed on people who complain about discrimination sharply 
discourage women from reporting it to authorities or legal institutions.26  The fear of retaliation is the primary 
reason why people choose not to challenge discrimination.27  Although it is impossible to know exactly how 
often retaliation occurs in response to a discrimination claim, the evidence suggests that such fears are not 
misplaced.28  Even if employers do not overtly retaliate, the social costs accompanying claims of discrimination 
are also difficult to bear.29  People are not well-liked when they report discrimination. They are viewed as 
troublemakers and experience reputational harm, even when their claims clearly have merit.30  As a result, the 
risks of retaliation are great and many employees are understandably reluctant to rush to file a discrimination 
claim. Such reluctance is especially likely if the pay disparity is relatively minor, yet, as we noted above, even 
minor pay disparities can add up to a very significant discrimination-based deficit over time. 
 
Challenging discrimination is likely to be especially costly for new employees, who are less able to secure Title 
VII’s promised protection from retaliation. In a retaliation claim, it is the employee’s burden to prove that the 
retaliatory measure was taken because the employee complained of discrimination, rather than for some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Filing a complaint, even a meritorious one, against one’s employer within 
the first six months makes that next to impossible. Unlike longstanding employees, new employees will not 
have the benefit of an established work record (likely complete with periodic positive evaluations) that is 
necessary to prove that an adverse action was retaliatory and not based on job performance. 
 
In light of the personal costs of reporting discrimination, an employee who is aware of pay discrimination might 
reasonably tolerate it for some time, until the discrimination deficit becomes too much for her to tolerate.Yet, 
under Ledbetter, once a salary review takes place, the employee loses her chance to challenge pay 
discrimination first set in motion by prior decisions. 
  
In addition to these difficulties, Ledbetter creates a dilemma for employees who complain to their employers 
too soon. A natural response to Ledbetter would be for employees to complain to their employers the moment 
they suspect pay discrimination. However, in a doctrinal Catch-22, an employee who complains to her employer 
too soon may find herself in an even worse position: out of a job because she complained, and with no legal 
recourse for the retaliation she suffered.   
 
Under Clark County School District v. Breeden, the Supreme Court held that an employee who opposes what 
she believes (inaccurately) to be unlawful discrimination is protected from retaliation only if she had a 
“reasonable belief” that the practice she opposed in fact violates Title VII.31  The plaintiff in Breeden internally 
complained about a sexually explicit colloquy between her supervisor and a coworker during a meeting that she 
found offensive. She was subsequently assigned to less desirable job duties and relieved of her supervisory 
responsibilities – as a result, she alleged, of her speaking out.   
 Title VII outlaws not only discrimination, but retaliation done to punish those who speak out about it. Yet the 
Supreme Court rejected Breeden’s retaliation claim on the ground that even if she had experienced retaliation in 
response to her complaint, no reasonable employee could have believed that the sexual dialogue would, without 
more, create a hostile environment in violation of Title VII.  In other words, if Breeden had waited until further 
offensive comments were made on other occasions to speak out, then she might have been able to win her 
retaliation claim. This standard leaves employees unprotected from retaliation if they oppose an employment 
practice too soon. Lower courts have applied this standard harshly, leaving plaintiffs unprotected for acting on 
their subjective beliefs that certain employer conduct is discriminatory without sufficient factual and legal 
support for proving an actual violation of Title VII. 
 
The dilemma for pay discrimination claimants is clear: It may take a pattern of substantial pay disparities in 
order to establish an inference that the gap in pay is attributable to gender bias, rather than to some legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason such as performance or experience. If the plaintiff waits too long, she loses her ability 
to challenge continuing discrimination in pay, even as the gap increases through neutral percentage-based 
raises. Yet if she complains to her employer at the first sign of a pay gap, she risks lacking an adequate 
foundation for a “reasonable belief” that the gap is attributable to gender discrimination -- leaving her 
vulnerable and unprotected from retaliation in response to her complaint.  
 
The only way out of this dilemma is for the employee to immediately file a charge with the EEOC at her very 
first suspicion of pay discrimination, without saying a word to her employer or anyone in the workplace -- since 
Breeden’s reasonable belief standard applies only to forms of “opposition” short of the formal EEOC charge-
filing process. Once a formal EEOC charge is filed, protection from retaliation kicks in, regardless of whether 
the plaintiff reasonably or unreasonably believed a violation occurred. 
 
One of the stranger results of the Ledbetter-Breeden dilemma is to encourage employees to avoid precisely the 
kind of informal, prompt resolution and conciliation of disputes that the majority in Ledbetter insists Title VII 
intends. Rather than risk speaking out to find out more information or try to improve the situation within a given 
company, employees are pressured to go straight (and silently) to the EEOC. 
 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Ledbetter inhibits the ability of pay discrimination plaintiffs to claim their 
substantive rights under Title VII. This narrowing of protection through the erection of procedural obstacles not 
only insulates pay discrimination from challenge, but will also exacerbate the longstanding, and seemingly 
intractable, gender wage gap. In the remaining sections, we review the data on the gender wage gap, consider 
the inadequacy of existing statutory protection, and map out specific action Congress could take to restore Title 
VII’s robust protection against pay discrimination and workplace discrimination more generally. 
 
The Persistent Gender Wage Gap and the Need for Congressional Action 
 
The gender-based wage gap in the United States is persistent and well-documented. Although researchers 
disagree about the size of the gap, almost all agree that it exists and is significant. Current estimates of the 
gender wage gap hover between seventy and eighty percent—meaning that a woman, on average, earns seventy 
to eighty cents for every dollar earned by a man.32  The pay gap is especially pronounced for African-American 
women and Hispanic or Latino women, who earn even less on the dollar compared to white men.33  
 
The gender wage gap exists at every level of earnings, but is largest at top of the earnings spectrum. For 
example, “Physicians and Surgeons,” is the highest paid occupational category for both sexes, yet the female 
median ($88,000) is only 63% of the male median ($140,000).34  The wage gap remains significant at the bottom 
of the earnings spectrum, however, especially since the effect of real-dollar differences may be felt most acutely 
by lower-wage workers.35  
 
Although the gender wage gap today is narrower than the 1970s measure of fifty-nine cents on the dollar, the 
bulk of the change occurred during the 1980s, and studies show little additional progress since 1990.36  
Moreover, the disparity in men’s and women’s wages extends, with some variation, throughout the employment 
lifecycle. Women in their 40s and 50s earn salaries more disparate from their male counterparts than do women 
at the beginning of their careers.37 When earnings over a longer period of time are aggregated, the gap is even 
starker. In their prime earning years, women earn only 38 percent of what men earn over a 15-year period.38   
 
Discrimination accounts for a significant part of the wage gap. Although there are plausible nondiscriminatory 
reasons for pay differences between men and women, none of them, even in the aggregate, explains the entire 
gap.39  For example, part of the wage gap is sometimes attributed to differing degrees of labor force attachment 
between men and women. Yet, women who work year-round and full-time during at least 12 of 15 consecutive 
years earn only 64 percent of what men with a similar attachment to the labor force earn.40  
 
Differences in the number of hours worked also fail to explain the gender disparity in wages. Hour-for-hour, 
women earn less than men.41 Similarly, differences in education explain little of the wage gap. According to 
2000 Census data, the “only women aged 35-54 to earn more than 71.4 percent of men at the median are those 
with some college education, but only a bit more, 72.1 percent.”42  Most importantly, when studies 
simultaneously control for multiple variables such as education, occupation, hours worked, and time away from 
the workplace because of family care responsibilities, a significant gender gap remains.43  
 
While debate continues over how much of the gender wage gap is explained by discrimination, clearly some 
employers continue to practice pay discrimination. For example, employers penalize women for expected leave-
taking out of proportion to the patterns many women actually follow.44  There is also a well-documented “wage 
premium” for married men, but not for married women, and a wage penalty of 10-15% for women who have 
children.45  Major U.S. corporations have settled multi-million dollar lawsuits for pay discrimination in recent 
years.46  
 
Most importantly, discriminatory pay decisions are not an isolated event. Rather, they continue to reverberate 
throughout a woman’s employment life. Even small pay disparities are typically magnified by percentage-based 
pay adjustments and morph over time into a devastating disadvantage. Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever 
found that a $4,000 (7.6%) starting pay disparity between a male and a female employee, followed by 3% 
annual raises, would evolve into a $15,000 annual disparity by age 60. That means the female employee may 
lose a total of $361,171 over her employment life, while the male employee gains a staggering $568,834 
assuming he earns even a modest three percent in interest on the difference.47 
 
Despite modest progress in narrowing the wage gap, sex discrimination in compensation persists, and the need 
for strong protection under Title VII is as great as ever. Ledbetter will exacerbate the existing problem of 
gender-based pay disparities, making the need for Congressional intervention more pressing than ever.  
 















With Ledbetter, current law provides inadequate protection against pay discrimination, particularly given the 
difficulties individual victims have in perceiving and challenging discrimination.   
 
Protection under the Equal Pay Act 
 
Some pay discrimination victims will find supplementary protection in the federal Equal Pay Act of 1963, 
which follows the paycheck accrual rule, and may thereby enable them to avoid Ledbetter’s harsh statute of 
limitations.48  The Equal Pay Act requires employers to pay men and women equally if they do substantially 
similar work, with possible defenses for pay disparities resulting from merit-based systems, seniority systems, 
or a factor other than sex.  A plaintiff may challenge an ongoing violation of the Equal Pay Act at any time, and 
may seek recovery for the prior two years of discrimination (or three years, if the violation is “willful”).   
 
The existence of the Equal Pay Act as an alternative statutory remedy for sex discrimination in pay does not, 
however, solve the problems created by the Ledbetter ruling.  First, much pay discrimination that violates Title 
VII is not covered under the Equal Pay Act. The Equal Pay Act is limited to cases where the plaintiff can point 
to a comparator of the opposite sex who does the same work in the same job for more money. Title VII, in 
contrast, reaches all claims of intentional pay discrimination, regardless of whether there is an opposite-sex 
comparator who earns more. For example, a woman who holds a unique job in a workplace, or simply a job that 
is not the equivalent of any job performed in that workplace by a higher-earning man, will have no hope of 
prevailing under the Equal Pay Act, even if can clearly be proven that the employer paid her less because of her 
sex.   
 
Second, the Equal Pay Act does not fully remedy even that pay discrimination that it does cover. Unlike Title 
VII, the Equal Pay Act does not permit compensatory or punitive damages. It is limited to back pay and, in 
certain cases, fixed and limited liquidated damages. The limited relief under the Equal Pay Act is wholly 
insufficient to create significant incentives on employers, especially large employers such as Goodyear, to 
prevent pay discrimination in the workplace, or to provide full remedies to the victims of pay discrimination. 
 
The unfortunate consequence of the Court’s ruling in Ledbetter is to effectively nullify Title VII’s broader reach 
by imposing a harsh and unrealistic filing deadline, leaving women only the protection of the narrower Equal 
Pay Act. This is an odd result, given that Title VII was passed after the Equal Pay Act and was intended to 
broaden pre-existing federal legal protection from sex discrimination. Moreover, the consequences are even 
harsher for victims of pay discrimination on bases other than sex: They are not protected by the Equal Pay Act 
at all. Victims of race-based pay discrimination, for example, will have no recourse if their claims are more than 
180-days old. Women of color, in particular, who already have difficulty sorting out the “race” from the 
“gender” components of bias in court cases, will have a particularly tough road to navigate. This seems 
especially unfair, as women who may be suffering two types of pay discrimination that converge, may end up 
having no viable case at all.  
 
Discovery Rules and Equitable Tolling 
 
The majority in Ledbetter held that the limitations period begins to run when the “discriminatory pay decision 
was made and communicated,” but it failed to provide clarification about what kind of information suffices to 
put an employee on notice that such a decision has been made. Is it enough for the employer to simply specify 
the employee’s new pay level?  Perhaps, more charitably, the majority meant that the time period starts running 
once the employee learns that she will receive an amount that is less than some of her male comparators who 
perform similar work? Or that she will receive a specified percentage raise that is less than the raises received 
by others? The Court’s refusal to address such questions suggests its lack of concern for the plight created for 
employees under this new rule. 
 The harshness of Ledbetter is exacerbated by the Court’s express refusal to consider whether a “discovery rule” 
applies to Title VII claims. (Such a rule, if adopted, operates to delay the statute of limitations until a plaintiff 
has “discovered” her injury.) The Court dismissed as “policy arguments” the concerns raised by the dissent 
about the hardship for employees who do not learn about pay disparities until it is too late to file a charge. The 
Court’s silence invites lower courts to design their own approach to handling delayed claims. 
 
In prior rulings, lower federal courts have split over the existence and scope of a discovery rule under Title VII 
or other federal anti-discrimination laws. The Fourth Circuit, for example, refused to apply a discovery rule to 
toll the statute of limitations in in Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank,49 a case alleging wrongful discharge under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.  In Hamilton, the plaintiff learned during the discovery process for his 
age discrimination lawsuit that he was paid less than younger employees in the same position. Based on this 
information, he filed a new complaint for pay discrimination, also under the ADEA, seventeen months after he 
had been discharged by the employer. The plaintiff specifically requested that the court apply a discovery rule 
to his pay discrimination claim, but the Fourth Circuit found the claim time-barred because “the 180-day period 
for filing claims begins to run from the time of an alleged discriminatory act.”50 
 
Other federal appellate courts have acknowledged the existence of a discovery rule in the context of federal 
anti-discrimination laws, but have construed it narrowly.  The Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Cada v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp. is a good example.51  The plaintiff in that case brought an age discrimination suit against his 
employer when, after telling a manager at the company that he would not be retiring, he was told he would be 
terminated.  The plaintiff did not believe the manager had the authority to fire him, but the termination was 
reaffirmed by his direct supervisor in a meeting a few weeks later.  His suit was filed within the limitations 
period52 of the meeting with his actual supervisor, but not of the conversation with the manager who first 
promised to fire him.  The Seventh Circuit in Cada recognized the existence of a discovery rule, but declined to 
apply it since it believed the date of accrual was the day the plaintiff was first informed he would be fired.    
 
Application of a discovery rule in the pay discrimination context is likely to be particularly unhelpful. A court 
would likely start the limitations period running from the time the employee learned that a male comparator 
earned a higher salary,53 even if the employee had no reason to suspect that discrimination has occurred.54 Such 
an approach would not solve the problems with perceiving discrimination. Even if an employee fortuitously 
learns of a male colleague’s salary, this information is unlikely to be accompanied by an explanation from the 
employer, broader wage data on the workplace, overt signs of prejudice, or any of the other information that 
enables employees to attribute adverse actions to discrimination. Current interpretations of the discovery rule 
make it an ineffective tool for protecting employees who do not have reason to suspect discrimination.   
 
Equitable tolling can be used to delay the limitations clock where an employee does not have reason to suspect 
discrimination. While courts generally acknowledge the availability of this device in Title VII, its typical 
application is too limited to affect most cases. Many courts do not toll the limitations period based on the 
employee’s lack of information unless the employer actively concealed relevant facts or actively misled the 
employee into believing she did not have a claim. But employer concealment of wrongdoing is not the main 
reason victims fail to perceive pay discrimination.  
 
Moreover, equitable tolling rules have other limitations. For example, pursuing a discrimination allegation 
through an employer’s internal complaint process does not toll the limitations period. An employee who first 
pursues a suspicion of discrimination through the employer’s internal procedures in an effort to find out what 
happened and try to resolve it internally will be foreclosed from filing a Title VII charge if she waits until that 
process ends and the 180-day time period passes. The failure to toll the limitations period while employees 
pursue internal procedures for redress creates an incentive to channel employee complaints into lengthy internal 
procedures and run out the clock so that employees lose their chance to file a formal claim. 
 
The absence of a meaningful discovery rule and fair equitable tolling rules makes plaintiffs’ compliance with 
Ledbetter all the more difficult, yet adoption of such rules will not solve the problem. At best, these are stop-gap 
measures that can help avoid injustice in rare situations. Even a broad discovery rule would not appreciably ease 
the burdens on employees to quickly perceive and challenge discrimination. Rather than hope for the best in the 
lower courts, Congress should step in to overturn the Ledbetter ruling. 
  
Mapping Out a Congressional Fix for Ledbetter  
 
On June 12, the House Education and Labor Committee held a hearing on the Ledbetter ruling to consider 
whether to take legislative action to restore Title VII’s protection against pay discrimination.  The Chairman of 
that Committee, Congressman George Miller (D-CA), subsequently introduced The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2007, which would overturn the Court’s decision and restore the paycheck accrual rule.  Congress should take 
this opportunity not only to fix the specific problems created by the Ledbetter decision, but to explore other 
Title VII deficiencies that deprive discrimination victims of full and fair remedies for their harm as well. 
 
Adopting a Paycheck Accrual Rule  
 
The most direct response by Congress to Ledbetter would be to adopt a paycheck accrual rule by statute, 
restoring the approach that courts took prior to the Supreme Court’s wayward ruling. This is effectively what 
the proposed Ledbetter Fair Pay Act would enact. 
 
Justice Ginsburg closed her dissent in Ledbetter with the exhortation that “[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress’ 
court,” a reference to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a federal law that overturned a spate of Supreme Court 
decisions adopting stingy readings and narrow interpretations of Title VII and other civil rights statutes.  One of 
the decisions overturned by the 1991 Act was Lorance v. AT&T Technologies.55  The Court in Lorance took a 
near-identical approach to filing requirements for challenging a discriminatory seniority system as it did in 
Ledbetter for pay discrimination.  In the ruling, the Court held that employees had to challenge the 
discriminatory seniority system within 180 days of when it was first adopted, rather than within 180 days of 
when it was first applied to them.   
 
Congress specifically overturned the Lorance ruling in the 1991 Act, correcting the injustice of barring 
employees from challenging discrimination that was perpetuated each time the seniority system was applied.56  
Although the statutory correction was specifically directed to seniority systems, the legislative history reflects 
Congress’ broad disapproval of the reasoning and the result.  In fact, an interpretative memorandum written by 
Senator Danforth, a key player behind the 1991 Act, disapproved the application of Lorance to contexts outside 
of seniority systems.57   
 
In Ledbetter, however, the Supreme Court ignored this legislative history and relied on the now-repudiated 
Lorance to support of its similar approach to pay claims.  As Justice Ginsburg points out in her dissent, the 
Court has “not once relied upon Lorance” in the “more than 15 years” since Congress passed the 1991 Act, and 
“[i]t is mistaken to do so now.”58   
 
The Court’s failure to take the lessons of the 1991 Act to heart makes the need for Congress to revisit its 
teachings all the more pressing.  Specifically, Congress should pass the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and restore the 
paycheck accrual rule—permitting employees to challenge pay discrimination that extends into the filing period 
regardless of when it first began—that lower courts had applied before Ledbetter.   
 
Lengthening the Statute of Limitations 
 
At the root of the problem for rights-claiming under Title VII is the statute’s unusually short statute of 
limitations.  Under current law, a victim of employment discrimination must file a charge with the EEOC within 
180 days “after the unlawful employment practice occurred.”59   
 When Title VII was first enacted in 1964, the statute of limitations was a mere 90 days, a provision meriting 
little discussion beyond the occasional reference to the problem of stale claims.60  Congress extended the 
limitations period to 180 days in 1972 to bring it into line with the National Labor Relations Act, the federal law 
that regulates unions.61 Although Title VII’s statute of limitations is 2-3 years shorter than the applicable period 
for most civil lawsuits, no serious effort was made to extend it again until 1990.   
 
A proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, a bill that was ultimately vetoed, included a provision extending the 
statute of limitations to two years. The proposed extension was intended to bring Title VII into line with other 
federal anti-discrimination laws. The House report on the bill criticized the existing limitations period because 
of the “substantial time” it takes for an individual to realize discrimination has occurred, to become educated 
about what remedies are available, and to seek the assistance of counsel. Opponents repeated familiar concerns 
about “stale claims.”62 A very similar bill was introduced in 1991, again including a two-year limitations period 
for discrimination claims brought under Title VII.63  This provision was contested and ultimately removed from 
the bill adopted as the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Opponents cited concerns about Title VII’s goal of “prompt 
resolution” and the potential expansion of liability for businesses.64   
 
Since 1991, no serious effort to extend Title VII’s statute of limitations has been made. Yet, such an extension 
would alleviate many of the unfair pressures currently placed on discrimination victims. Time, it turns out, is 
important to the realization of discrimination and the development of the willingness to complain, not to 
mention more mundane steps like figuring out how to file a complaint, marshalling the resources necessary to 
engage in litigation, and finding a lawyer who will take the case, and so on. There is no good reason why a 
person who slips in a grocery store aisle because of an uncleaned spill should have two years longer than a 
person who suffers pay discrimination to figure out what happened, who is to blame, and how to enforce her 
rights. 
 
Lifting the Caps on Damages 
 
Justice Ginsburg also noted, in her dissent in Ledbetter, the unfairness that arises from the non-uniformity 
among federal civil rights laws. Women, for example, may be able to seek redress some types of pay 
discrimination through the Equal Pay Act, thereby avoiding the Court’s harsh rule in Ledbetter.  But victims of 
pay discrimination based on race, for example, will not have that option. And even for women, as explained 
above, the Equal Pay Act is inadequate to fill the gaps in Title VII’s protection created by Ledbetter.  
 
There is yet another kind of inequity resulting from the non-uniformity of our federal civil rights laws that is 
blatantly apparent from the Ledbetter case. Because Ledbetter involved a claim for sex discrimination under 
Title VII, the plaintiff’s damages were capped by the statutory limit of $300,000 applicable to large employers.  
The $300,000 limit applies to combined compensatory and punitive damages, and to all claims in the case. An 
employer that violates the statute in numerous ways, for example, by retaliating against the employee as well as 
engaging in discrimination and harassment, cannot be liable for more than $300,000 in combined damages on 
all claims. The cap applies to Title VII violations except for claims challenging conduct covered by Section 
1981, which bars race discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, including employment 
contracts. Thus, damages from sex discrimination are capped under Title VII, while damages for race 
discrimination, in violation of Section 1981, are not. 
 
The Ledbetter case is a good illustration of the caps in practice. The jury awarded Ledbetter of over $3.5 
million, which included a substantial punitive damages award to punish Goodyear for its gross misconduct.  
Because of the caps, however, this award was reduced to $360,000, the maximum allowable combined 
compensatory and punitive damages plus an award of $60,000 in back pay. With the caps in place, a company 
such as Goodyear stands to lose very little by violating Title VII, even if its conduct is blatant and egregious.  
 
Even when adopted in 1991, a $300,000 cap on damages (even lower for smaller employers) was ill-advised for 
a statute purportedly designed to deter employers from violating Title VII. Sixteen years later, it obviously 
provides insufficient monetary penalties to deter violations of the law. Surely one of the lawyers at Goodyear 
could have easily discovered that the Gasden plant paid its only female manager a substantially lower salary 
than each of its fifteen male managers, and indeed, had never paid a female manager equally to a man. If the 
penalties for violating Title VII were more substantial, companies like Goodyear would have more incentive to 
be proactive, and to make sure that they complied with equal pay requirements.  
 
Congress should thus lift the statutory cap on damages in Title VII so as to permit plaintiffs full recovery for 
intentional employment discrimination and impose sufficient incentives on employers to deter discrimination in 




Ledbetter v. Goodyear has seriously undercut federal statutory protection against pay discrimination. Given the 
entrenched gender wage gap and the documented existence of pay discrimination, this is a ruling under which 
female employees cannot afford to labor. Fortunately, as it has done in the past with similar judicial 
retrenchments from civil rights protections, Congress can undo the damage with legislative action. At a 
minimum, Congress should adopt a paycheck accrual rule by statute. But beyond that, Congress should take this 
opportunity to make other needed corrections to Title VII: lengthening the statute of limitations and eliminating 
the cap on damages. These changes would grant employees a fair chance at challenging unlawful pay 
discrimination and other forms of workplace bias.   
____________________ 
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